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ABSTRACT 
Techniques are described herein to provide distributed end-to-end policy 
management across a chain of service provider networks (i.e., administrative domains).  
The techniques leverage an agent-centric framework for a fully distributed peer-to-peer 
network that allows nodes to maintain decentralized tamper-proof hash chains (e.g., 
Holochain).  With this framework, the techniques are able to quickly and conveniently 
indicate network policies across a chain of service providers, in a distributed manner, and 
guarantee that requirements of the policies are met along the chain of service providers.  
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Internet-based applications and services are often provided to a network by a chain 
of administrative domains.  For example, administrative domains of service providers in a 
chain of service providers (referred to herein as a “SP chain”) may convey packets for a 
given Internet Protocol (IP) service or application.  Often, an SP chain provides static 
network parameters (i.e., a fixed maximum bandwidth) and the various administrative 
domains forming the chain are unable to communicate to coordinate any changes (e.g., to 
propagate filter rules across the SP chain).  Consequently, it may be difficult, expensive, 
and/or inefficient for a network (i.e., a home network or enterprise network) to obtain 
connectivity for an IP application or service with suitable network parameters, especially 
for networks with shifting and dynamic needs (i.e., networks that intermittently or 
infrequently need increased upload speed, bandwidth, etc. for a particular service or 
application).  Moreover, the foregoing issues may make it difficult to achieve privacy in 
an SP chain for differential service offerings. 
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As a specific example, enterprises may need to intermittently export large amounts 
of data (e.g., hundreds of gigabytes or one or more terabytes) to the Cloud for big data 
analytics (e.g., network assurance, wireless service assurance, etc.), but may only 
intermittently need increased upload speeds for these exports and would rather not pay for 
the increased upload speeds between uploads.  As another example, a home network user 
might want increased bandwidth to watch a three-dimensional (3D) movie for two hours, 
but might not want to pay for this increased bandwidth before and after watching the 3D 
movie.  Typically, there are not convenient, efficient, and secure techniques available to 
allow these temporary on-demand (i.e., requirement driven) end-to-end IP connectivity 
service requests to be indicated and guaranteed across an SP chain.   
Moreover, often an SP chain may have a limited ability to identify and defend 
against network threats/attacks, such as a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack (e.g., 
since limited communications between administrative domains limit the SP chain’s ability 
to collectively filter traffic from an attacker).  For example, with DDoS attacks, an attacker 
attempts to compromise host devices and use those infected host devices to make machines 
or network resources (e.g., an application server, a client, a router, a firewall, or a network 
list of an entire network etc.) unavailable to their intended users. DDoS attack can be 
mitigated by blocking traffic from the attacker(s) (e.g., with filter rules); however, currently, 
there are not many techniques that allow for communication across an SP chain to 
coordinate such efforts (e.g., to propagate filtering rules).  
Some techniques utilize blockchain techniques to try to provide communication 
across SP chains.  However, recently, blockchain has been discovered to have a number of 
drawbacks/limitations.  For example, since blockchain techniques require data to be 
replicated on all blockchain nodes, blockchain techniques may create scalability issues.  
Moreover, the number of transactions may limit scaling.  Additionally, convergence time 
may be relatively long for some blockchains so that, for example, adding transactions to a 
blockchain might take a couple of minutes in some uses cases.  Still further, time must be 
synchronized across blockchain nodes since timestamps are part of transactions and are 
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In view of the foregoing, the techniques presented herein enable communication 
across an SP chain to provide distributed end-to-end policy management across multiple 
service providers networks (i.e., administrative domains).  To achieve this, the techniques 
leverages an agent-centric framework for a fully distributed peer-to-peer network that 
allows nodes to maintain decentralized tamper-proof hash chains (e.g., a Holochain 
framework).  With this framework (referred to herein as “agent-centric framework,” “the 
framework”, “agent-centric hash chain framework,” etc.), the techniques are able to 
quickly and conveniently indicate network policies across a chain of service providers, in 
a distributed manner, and guarantee that requirements of the policies are met along the 
chain of service providers.  Notably, since the end-to-end policy management is distributed, 
the techniques may be easily scalable.  Moreover, the framework ensures that the end-to-
end policy management is efficient (e.g., since convergence is unnecessary).   
Generally, these techniques are generic in nature so that they are applicable to any 
end-to-end or multi-node policy that should be verified across multiple service provider 
networks (i.e., administrative domains).  That is, the techniques presented herein provide a 
convenient and useful method to indicate, in a distributed manner, any network policy 
across domains of an SP chain and to guarantee, in a distributed manner, that the 
requirements are met.  Thus, although the techniques presented herein are discussed with 
respect to satisfying on-demand bandwidth requests and defending against DDoS attacks, 
the techniques can also be used with for a variety of other functions/purposes, such as 
service level agreement (SLA) management and verification (e.g., via performance 
metrics).  That said, among other advantages, these techniques can allow an SP chain to 
accommodate additional bandwidth for specific duration (e.g., which subscribers can 
request and pay for accordingly) and/or to defend against attacks (e.g., a DDoS attack).  
The techniques may also ensure privacy of and/or allow granularity for an SP chain by, for 
example, managing fixed and variable costs of an SP chain and/or adjusting the services in 
the SP chain on a per-customer basis (which may be valuable to customers and service 
providers).   
 As a specific example, Figure 1 below provides a sequence diagram that illustrates 
how the techniques can determine if IP service/application requirements are met across an 
SP chain by leveraging a fully distributed peer-to-peer agent-centric framework that allows 
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nodes to maintain decentralized tamper-proof hash chains (e.g., Holochain).  Generally, 
the framework provides a fully distributed way of data sharing and access, with secure 
peer-to-peer network communication (i.e., no centralized server, no ledgers, no 
intermediaries, no miners).  Each node stores its own immutable hash chain to maintain 
ordered transactions based on a time sequence at each node (and, thus, is agent-centric) 
and can communicate with other nodes to propagate data.  For example, when a node 
receives a message, it can broadcast the message to some or all of its peers, which can 
propagate the message to their peers, creating an exponential rate of propagation.  The 
nodes can each share entries, metadata, neighborhood health, and peer addresses. 
Additionally, the framework may utilize digital signatures that provide authenticity 
and ownership of data and a distributed hash table (DHT) to provide de-centralized data 
storage (e.g., so that data can be hosted by entities other than a centralized authority 
system).  The DHT utilizes cryptographic hashes for content-addressable storage and 
validates with the hash-chains and digital signature before storing transactions.   
Generally, in a DHT, nodes coordinate amongst themselves to balance and store 
data in the network without any central coordinating party.  DHTs are both fault tolerant 
and resilient when key/value pairs are replicated, but require that information to be evenly 
distributed across the network.  Thus, DHTs utilize consistent hashing, where a key is 
passed through a hash algorithm that serves as a randomization function, ensuring that each 
node in the network has an equal chance of being chosen to store the key/value pair.  
Typically, DHTs only use the hash of the data itself to confirm authenticity, provenance, 
timelines, or integrity of data sources.  However, in the framework leveraged by the 
presented techniques, validation rules can be embedded as a condition for the propagation 
of data, which keeps data bound to signed source chains (e.g., the framework may use a 
Holochain DHT).  This provides similar consistency and rule enforcement to blockchain 
ledgers in an asynchronous manner while alleviating bottlenecks caused by consensus 
requirements.  That is, the framework DHT leverages signed source chains to ensure 
tamper-proof immutability of data and to verify data origins and provenance.  The 
framework DHT also emulates aspects of a graph database by enabling nodes to connect 
links to other hashes in the DHT tagged with semantic markers, which may help locate 
hashes for retrieval from the DHT. 
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As mentioned above, Figure 1 illustrates how the techniques presented herein can 
leverage the framework (e.g., Holochain framework) to determine if IP service/application 
requirements are met across an SP chain.  This example illustrates how the techniques can 
handle an on-demand bandwidth request, but as mentioned, this is merely an example and 
the techniques are applicable to a variety of parameters.  Initially, an enterprise or home 
network implementing the techniques presented herein creates a request for the service 
providers in an SP chain provide additional bandwidth for a flow or set of flows for a 
specific duration.  The enterprise or home network may also convey path characteristics, 
like downstream or upstream delay tolerance, loss tolerance, jitter tolerance, minimum and 
maximum bandwidth in the request.  That is, the enterprise or home network can create a 
transaction T with a general or specific request.   
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Once the request is created, a node of the decentralized framework associated with 
the home or enterprise network signs transaction T and adds it to its local hash-chain.  
Although Figure 1 illustrates the node as a device in the home or enterprise network, the 
node could also be a service provider node directly connected to the home or enterprise 
network.  Next, the signed transaction T is published to the DHT and the request is 
conveyed (using peer-to-peer communication protocols) to all other service providers in 
the SP chain.  In response to the request, each service provider in the SP chain processes 
the request and publishes a signed notification response to the DHT (e.g., indicating they 
can and will accommodate the bandwidth requirement).  Assuming all of the service 
providers in the SP chain agree, the last service provider in the SP chain also publishes a 
signed notification to every other Service Provider in the chain, allowing every service 
provider on the SP chain to know the request has reached the last service provider.  At this 
point, the enterprise or home network will also know if the bandwidth requirement can be 
fully or partially met by the service providers in the SP chain. 
If the requested path characteristics will be honored by all the service providers in 
the SP chain, the enterprise or home network can execute a payment deposit contract to 
pay to the service providers in the SP chain.  Once the payment deposit contract is executed, 
service providers in the SP chain provision their network to accommodate the path 
characteristics conveyed by the enterprise or home network and the enterprise or home 
network can use the applications that need additional bandwidth for the requested duration.  
Moreover, during the requested duration of time, service providers in the SP chain can 
publish network performance metrics for SLA monitoring. If the SLA requirements are 
met for the requested duration, the payment deposit contract will be executed to pay to the 
service providers in the SP chain. 
Consequently, the techniques may allow multiple businesses or enterprises to be 
part of the same end-to-end request.  Moreover, the techniques can track service provider 
compliance with requests without an out-of-band and/or centralized mechanism.  Still 
further, during execution of these techniques, fixed and variable costs of the SP chain can 
be managed privately because the framework may implement generic validation rules for 
the whole SP chain and service provider specific validation rules that include fixed and 
variable costing, security policies, services offered etc.  That is, the techniques presented 
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herein resolve on-demand end-to-end provisioning in an SP chain (e.g., bandwidth 
demands) in an efficient, private, secure, and authentic manner.   
If, instead, the transaction T of Figure 1 was intended to protect against a DDoS 
attack, transaction T could request to enforce filter rules (e.g., conveyed in Boarder 
Gateway Protocol (BGP) flowspec).  The transaction T could include DDoS attack details 
such as attack type, total dropped packet count, average dropped packets per second etc. 
and would be signed and stored in local Hash-Chain.  As mentioned above, once a 
transaction T is stored in the local Hash-Chain, the transaction T is published to the DHT 
and conveyed (using peer-to-peer communication protocols) to all other service providers 
in the SP chain. 
After the transaction T is published and conveyed, service providers in the SP chain 
could use DDoS detection techniques to analyze flow records, packet samples collected 
from the attackers IP addresses (e.g., conveyed in the BGP flowspec) to check if a DDoS 
attack has been launched on a target/victim (e.g., the home or enterprise network initiating 
the request).  Then, DDoS traffic from the attacker will be filtered and the target/victim 
network will know which service providers in the SP chain agreed to honor the filtering 
rules.  Moreover, if service providers did not agree, it might be indicative that the service 
providers are compromised.  Since the framework leveraged by the techniques presented 
herein provides a tamper-proof manner of conveying information in full distributed 
computing environment, the conveyed information is not only authentic, it is immutable.  
Thus, among other advantages, when the techniques implemented herein are utilized to 
defend against DDoS, the techniques may gather DDoS attack information and application-
level statistics in a distributed manner and acquire application level acknowledgement that 
filtering rules are being enforced. 
In summary, techniques are described herein to provide distributed end-to-end 
policy management across a chain of service provider networks (i.e., administrative 
domains).  The techniques leverage an agent-centric framework for a fully distributed peer-
to-peer network that allows nodes to maintain decentralized tamper-proof hash chains (e.g., 
Holochain).  With this framework, the techniques are able to quickly and conveniently 
indicate network policies across a chain of service providers, in a distributed manner, and 
guarantee that requirements of the policies are met along the chain of service providers.  
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